“What is happening today in Moldova almost entirely mirrors the processes already seen in Ukraine,” Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs says in a report published earlier this year.

For more than a decade, Moscow has been receiving quarterly reports from Chisinau about the alleged “violation of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots.” The organization sending these reports receives annual funding between €10,000 and €20,000 while its leaders actively push for Russian narratives in Moldova.

Documents analyzed as part of the #DearCompatriots project — a series of cross-border investigations mapping the Russian Federation’s global influence network — reveal how these reports help feed Moscow’s rhetoric regarding the Republic of Moldova.

The cross-border project #DearCompatriots exposes a global influence network employed by Russia for over a decade. The series draws on nearly 50,000 internal emails from Pravfond — a state-run foundation advancing the Kremlin’s agenda under the guise of defending human rights, while providing legal support to alleged suspected spies, criminals, and propagandists. 

“Moldova is rapidly sliding toward supporting neo-Nazi and racially discriminatory ideologies” — this is how the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins the section on Moldova in its report about the alleged “violation of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad.” It established the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Russian Compatriots Abroad — known as Pravfond — with the stated mission of defending the rights of Russian diasporas, primarily by providing legal assistance.

In turn, Pravfond has funded the several “legal support centers” around the world, including two operating in Moldova: one in Chisinau, the capital, and another in Tiraspol, administrative center of the Transnistrian breakaway enclave in eastern Moldova.

“GRACE TO ASSISTANCE”
In September 2014, a Center for Human Rights Information and Analysis began operating in Chisinau. Not as a distinct legal entity, but rather as part of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Moldova, which at the time was overseen by Moldovan municipal councilor Piotr Dontov. The head of the Center is Mihail Sidorov, a former communist MP.

The unit led by Mr. Sidorov focuses on providing legal assistance to Moldova’s ethnic minority citizens, particularly those in Russian-speaking communities. It also holds roundtables, conferences, and public debates on minority rights. All of these activities are regularly reported to Moscow, with spotlights on cases of alleged discrimination against Russophone minority in Moldova.

The very first report Mr. Sidorov filed for Pravfond states that “the center’s setup was possible grace to the Foundation’s support.” In fact, the center kicked off its activities exactly when Pravfond stopped funding the organization led by Valery Klimenko, another Russian proxy in Moldova. RISE Moldova covered this organization in the investigation „Pravdfond: „Unitatea de luptă” din Moldova” (Pravfond: A Combat Unit in Moldova).

Internal email leaks from Pravfond reveal that between 2016 and 2023, Sidorov’s center received at least $110,000 in financial aid from Moscow. According to grant agreements, the funds were allocated for legal assistance — including representation in courts, event management, rights monitoring, and reporting on the status of the Russian minority in Moldova.

An analysis by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCPR) shows that Pravfond-funded centers around the world follow a clear ideological pattern. In 2022, just days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Pravfond held a video conference via internet link with all centers under its command to share “the reasons and objectives behind Moscow’s decision to carry out a liberation mission in Ukraine,” as noted by the Foundation’s director Alexandr Udaltsov in a report to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

RUSSOPHOBIA, ANTI-RUSSIA SENTIMENT, AND MONOPOLY OF ROMANIAN LANGUAGE
We reviewed the reports sent by Mihail Sidorov to Pravfond during the period 2014–2024. In addition to quarterly summaries about the influence hub’s activities, Mr. Sidorov consistently flags alleged violations of Russian minority rights in Moldova. The issues he’s raised remain virtually unchanged from year to year.

His reports for Moscow depict a reality in which Russian-speaking communities are increasingly facing discrimination. Terms such as “radical nationalism,” “Russophobia,” and “marginalization of the Russian language” appear frequently in his accounts from Chisinau.

“There is growing concern over the rise of unionist sentiment in Moldovan society and the replacement of the state’s official language name from ‘Moldovan’ to ‘Romanian’,” Sidorov complained in one of his reports. He also highlighted the loss of Russian’s status as a language of interethnic communication and its gradual elimination from education, public administration, and media.

In a report submitted in 2023, the former legislator expressed concern about changes to the Penal Code. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moldovan authorities added a new article to the Penal Code, criminalizing separatism. The new legal provision mandates prison sentences for actions aimed at separating any part of Moldova’s territory or inciting separatism in any form. In his report to Pravfond, Sidorov warned that the law could heighten internal tensions and derail negotiations concerning the frozen Transnistrian conflict.

“Adoption of this law will escalate lead tension within [Moldovan] society. Most notably, it affects the future of the negotiation process on Transnistria, which could be halted. There are concerns that officials working in Transnistrian administrative structures might face criminal liability,” he stressed.

In another report, in 2024, Sidorov acknowledged that he had participated in an online conference organized by the Journalist House Discussion Club in Voronezh, Russian Federation, where he spoke about the status of the Russian language in Moldova.

“Participants were informed about the authorities’ efforts to change the linguistic landscape of the country — efforts aimed at abandoning the traditional Moldovan-Russian bilingualism, restricting the use of the Russian language, stripping it of its role as a language of interethnic communication, and establishing a monopoly for the Romanian language,” the head of the Russian shell NGO reported.

But Sidorov had already raised concerns about this so-called “monopoly of the Romanian language” and the “shrinking scope of Russian usage” in his very first report to Pravfond, submitted 11 years ago. These two themes are virtually ever-present in his dispatches.

In addition to formal reports, there are also brief memos containing “supplementary information on the activities of the Center for Information and Human Rights Analysis,” as the Kremlin-aligned outpost is called.

HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER IN TIRASPOL
A similar center has also been operating since 2012 in the Transnistrian region. It is part of the Union of Russian Communities in Transnistria (Союз русских общин Приднестровья), run by pro-Russia activist Viorica Kohtareva, 48. According to her CV, Kohtareva is a member of the advisory board at the Russian Embassy to Moldova.

In 2014, she proposed a petition calling for Transnistria annexation by the Russian Federation, following the playbook of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine. According to her own account, more than 180,000 Transnistrian residents signed the petition to Vladimir Putin, urging him to incorporate the region within Russia.

In 2015, while attending the World Congress of Russian Compatriots, Mrs. Kohtareva stated:

“This makes us very happy. It demonstrates that Russia is aware about us, remembers us, loves us, and is always ready to welcome us.”

Viorica Kohtareva and Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Ozerov greet the arrival of Russian aid, 17 January 2025. Source: Telegram channel of the Russian Embassy.

The documents leaked from the Pravfond email servers show that between 2022 and 2024, the Tiraspol-based center received 1.64 million Russian rubles (over 21,000 US dollars). For the most part, its operations were limited to legal services for Russian citizenship applicants or paperwork guidance on getting criminal records or repatriation certificates from the Russian Embassy — such as criminal records or repatriation certificates. Some money was spent on various propaganda events for local residents.

Unlike its sister center in Chisinau, the one in Tiraspol has found not one instance of “mass violations of the rights of compatriots.” In a 2022 report, Kohtareva mentions an increase in false bomb alerts at educational and medical institutions, citing in the context the situation in Ukraine and Transnistria’s proximity to the border, ”as well as Ukraine’s negative stance toward pro-Russia attitudes of local residents.” The center itself received a bomb alert.

A MESSENGER OF SOVIET NOSTALGIA IN MOLDOVA
As mentioned above, the Human Rights Information and Analysis Center in Chisinau operates under the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots, an NGO. In 2022, the organization was taken over by Alexei Petrovici, a Kremlin-leaning activist. Petrovici, too, is a recipient of Pravfond money, though through a different NGO: the Russian Historical-Patriotic Club. This propagandist tool received funding during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Its official goal: defending the memory of the World War II in Moldova.

The Pravfond email leak suggests that at least three projects overseen by Alexei Petrovici have received funding from the Russian Federation.

In 2022, Petrovici received a grant of 480,000 rubles (approximately $7,500) to organize the exhibition “The Immortal Stalingrad”. Dressed in military-style attire, he delivered lectures in several schools across the country to mark the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. The event was described by Gagauzia’s public television as “a lesson of patriotism.” However, the exhibition drew criticism from both civil society and Moldovan authorities.

Although documents show that the 2022 exhibition was funded by the Russian foundation Pravfond, Alexei Petrovici previously claimed in a statement to nokta.md that the money had come from private donations. Yet when RISE Moldova asked again about the source of funding, the activist avoided a direct answer:

“The exhibition has been taking place in our country since 2017.” It was planned back at that time, and that’s when it was framed as well […] There was no question about support and no discussion about carrying out this project with funds provided by Pravfond in 2017.”

School children from Egorovca, Falesti District, visit the exhibition „Immortal Stalingrad.” Picture and description provided by Alexei Petrovici/FacebookIn March 2024, Petrovici requested new funding — $7,400 — for a project called “Soldier of Victory,” with a duration through December 2024. In the project proposal, he announced the intention to publish at least 400 articles on military history in order to “widely articulate the topic regarding Moldova’s liberation from fascism within Moldova and beyond.”

Mr. Petrovici listed as his project partners the Sputnik-Moldova, a digital outlet, and Novosti–Moldova news agency, two Russian sources with coverage in the Gagauzian autonomy and the Transnistrian region. After the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022, Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) blocked access to sputnik.md, citing that the website “shares information inciting to hatred and war.”

The funding was requested after Pravfond was added to the European Union’s sanctions list for “supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.” So, RISE Moldova asked Alexei Petrovici whether he had been contacted by the competent authorities in light of receiving money from an entity under sanctions.

He claimed that both his personal bank accounts and the accounts of his organization had been blocked, stating: “All attempts to open new accounts in other banks were useless, and from what I’ve learned my organization and myself personally are apparently on an unofficial list of people and entities that are currently prohibited from holding bank accounts.”

According to Promo-LEX lawyer Vadim Vieru, “individuals who receive funding from this kind of donors [meaning Pravfond] may become subject to investigation for potential money-laundering, evasion of international sanctions, or even complicity in activities deemed as illicit. Consequences range from denial of access to funds through reputable financial institutions to criminal probe if there is suspicion of violation of money-laundering laws or specific E.U. regulations.”

“COUNTERING RUSSOPHOBIA AND DISTORTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH”
Vladimir Pozdorovkin, Pravfond’s deputy director, mentioned in one of his reports a new project proposal submitted by Alexei Petrovici, also funded by this organization. However, no grant application papers apparently exist.

The project refers to a photo exhibition titled “The Power of the Weak: The Female Face of the Great Patriotic War,” which falls under Pravfond’s program “Countering Russophobia and Distortion of Historical Truth. Supporting the Veterans of the Great Patriotic War.”

Petrovici’s project is part of a broader agenda of propagandist initiatives, among them the release of a book titled “Ukrainian Crimes Against Humanity 2022–2023” and a series of international conferences themed “Ukrainian Nazism in the 21st Century: Roots and Branches.”

The exhibition organized by Petrovici is referenced in Pravfond’s official activity report, which was submitted to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year 2023.

“Despite resistance from Moldovan authorities, the Russian Historical-Patriotic Club in Chisinau, led by A. Petrovici, has organized 15 presentations of the photo exhibition ‘The Power of the Weak: The Female Face of the Great Patriotic War’ throughout the year in Moldova. Thousands of people have visited the exhibition dedicated to the heroic participation of Soviet women in the Great Patriotic War. With the Foundation’s support, the club continues its search labor to refresh remembrance of Soviet soldiers who helped liberate this country from fascists.”

In a recent interview for Sputnik-Moldova, Mr. Petrovici said he continued his visits to schools. “I go incognito, not out of fear, but because principals are afraid of reprisals from the Ministry of Education. Still, they care about the future of their students, they invite me, and I speak with students face to face.”

KREMLIN’S ECHO
Alexei Petrovici, however, does not confine himself to memorial rhetoric. He frequently draws parallels with Ukraine, warning that Moldova is following the same path.

“Various European officials come here like it’s their workplace, while our leadership just serves as decor. (…) If Ukraine has become a great anti-Russia, then Moldova is being shaped into a miniature copy of anti-Russia,” he said in a recent interview.

In fact, his statement seems to echo — almost word for word — a passage from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s report on the status of Russian minorities, claiming that “Acting on orders from Western handlers, Chisinau is walking the same path in its policy as the nationalist regimes in Ukraine and the Baltic states, based on Russophobia and crude anti-Sovietism.”

The pro-Russia activist repeats the Kremlin’s narratives to fuel the fears of war and military threats. “I am seeing active militarization [of Moldova], NATO weapons are being stockpiled, and the government is pursuing an absolutely aggressive policy vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, Russian nationals, Russian diplomacy, and even its own people,” he stated.

In his public appearances, Alexei Petrovici follows the Russian Foreign Ministry’s report on the alleged violation of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Moldova with a striking precision — the themes he’s raised almost perfectly overlap with the report’s talking points.

We asked Alexei Petrovici about his stance regarding credible reports that his donor has also financed spies, criminals, and propagandists in various countries. In his response, he referred to the work of the analytical center led by Mr. Sidorov, indicating that its activities are “strictly humanitarian.”

Alexei PETROVICI: “The grant provided by the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Russian Compatriots Abroad for informational and analytical work in our country is carried out exclusively for humanitarian purposes — strictly for the analysis of Moldovan and international legislation related to human rights. This grant has not had and does not have any other aims or objectives to this day.”

Neither Mihail Sidorov nor Viorica Kohtareva has responded to RISE’s inquiries by the time this text went live.

 

Marcela ZAMOSTEANU

Fact-checking: RISE Moldova’s fact-checking department

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This is a translated version of the original text in Romanian, available HERE.

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